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Many economists and policy-makers argue that households do not save enough to maintain an 
adequate standard of living during retirement. However, there is no consensus on the answer 
to the underlying question about what this standard should be, despite the fact that it is crucial 
for the design of saving incentives and pension systems. We address this question with a 
randomized survey design, individually tailored to each respondent’s financial situation, and 
conducted both in the U.S. and the Netherlands. Key findings include the following. Adequate 
levels of retirement spending exceed 80 percent of working life spending for a majority of 
respondents. Minimum acceptable replacement rates depend strongly on income. Households 
in the Netherlands are much more risk averse than U.S. households. 
JEL-Code: D91, H55. 
Keywords: life cycle preferences, pension reform, replacement rates, retirement saving, cross-




Department of Economics 
CentER and Netspar 
Tilburg University 
P.O. Box 90153 
The Netherlands – 5000 LE Tilburg 
j.binswanger@uvt.nl 
Daniel Schunk 
Institute for Empirical Research in 
Economics (IEW) 





December 1, 2009 
We are grateful to Yvonne Adema, Rotraut Binswanger, Jan Boone, Axel Börsch-Supan, 
Katie Carman, Norma Coe, Jeffrey Dominitz, Josef Falkinger, Ernst Fehr, Alia Gizatulina, 
Sally Gschwend, Michael Halliasos, Eline van der Heijden, Hendrik Jürges, Arie Kapteyn, 
Miles Kimball, Markus Knell, Annamaria Lusardi, Olivia Mitchell, Hans-Theo Normann, 
Charles Noussair, Jan Potters, Maarten van Rooij, Claudia Sahm, Matthew Shapiro, Jonathan 
Skinner, Arthur van Soest, Karen van der Wiel, Joachim Winter, and to participants at the 
MESS workshop, at Netspar workshops, at the conference on ’Economic and Psychological 
Aspects of Household Saving Behavior’ in Deidesheim, and seminar participants at Tilburg 
University, the University of Mannheim, and the University of Muenster for many helpful 
comments. Daniel Schunk thanks the Center for Economic Studies (University of Munich), 
where part of this work was done, for its generous hospitality and the helpful comments from 
colleagues. Special thanks go to Vera Toepoel from CentERdata and to Bas Weerman from 
RAND for programming our questionnaire. Financial support from CentER and Netspar is 
gratefully acknowledged. 1 Introduction
What level of spending during retirement do people consider desirable, given their lifetime
budget constraints? How does this level compare to spending during working life? Is there
a minimum level of retirement spending which people want to maintain at all costs? How
much risk are individuals ready to bear in exchange for a higher expected standard of
living during retirement? The answers to these questions allow us to take an informed
stand on an important issue that many economists and policy makers are concerned with:
that people may not prepare adequately for retirement (Banks et al., 1998; Bernheim et
al., 2000; Fornero et al., 2009; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Munnell et al., 2006; Skinner,
2007; Thaler, 1994). The answers to the above questions are furthermore important for
several countries that are currently considering reforming their pension systems, since any
pension reform plan requires information about adequate old-age consumption levels.
There are several existing approaches for determining adequate levels of old-age con-
sumption. First, in a study that reports that a non-negligible fraction of the British
population might be at risk of an inadequately low standard of living during retirement,
Banks et al. (2005a) argue that a minimal requirement for an adequate old-age spend-
ing may be that it exceeds the poverty line. Second, an adequate spending level during
retirement may be seen as one that does not fall short of a certain benchmark fraction
of (annual) consumption during active life, such as 67 or 80 or 100 percent (Banks et
al., 2005a; Moore and Mitchell, 1997; Palmer, 1994). The great advantage of these two
approaches is that they are straightforward to operationalize. Furthermore, the meaning
of both adequacy measures is very intuitive. The disadvantage is that they are not based
on individual preferences.
This disadvantage is addressed by a further approach which we may dub the preference-
based calibration approach. This approach postulates a particular utility function, typ-
ically a time-separable form of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility. Making
speciﬁc assumptions about the parameters of this function as well as about other rele-
1vant variables such as interest rates and equity returns allows the analyst to calibrate
optimal consumption choices during old age and during working life. According to the
calibration approach, actually observed choices are considered adequate if they come suf-
ﬁciently close to these calibrated choices. This approach is pursued in, for instance, the
study of Scholz et al. (2006) which ﬁnds that many people appear to either save opti-
mally for retirement or, in many cases, to over-save. The calibration approach is very
compelling since it explicitly takes into account information about individual preferences
when computing an adequate level of old-age consumption. However, this approach re-
quires strong assumptions about the functional forms and parameter values of preferences,
although solid information about appropriate functional forms and parameter values that
best correspond to individuals’ preferences is not available in many cases.1,2
In sum, there is no consensus about what constitutes an adequate level of retirement
consumption. Rather, the identiﬁcation of the most appropriate approach for determining
a benchmark level for adequate retirement consumption remains an open issue (Banks et
al., 2002).
In this paper, we aim to advance the existing literature by investigating the adequacy
of old-age consumption based on a diﬀerent approach, inspired by work on risk and time
1For instance, as pointed out by Poterba et al. (2003), “within the framework of parametric CRRA
utility functions, there is little consensus on the ‘correct’ value of the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient”
(p. 26).
2Note that it may seem that this problem of the calibration approach could be avoided by a re-
vealed preference approach. This would entail an econometric analysis of individuals’ observed retirement
preparation choices which, in turn, would allow for inference of their preferences. However, an inherent
problem with this procedure is that people’s actual retirement preparation choices may not be in their
best self-interest. This may be due to the fact that individuals simply adopt defaults (Beshears et al.,
2006; Madrian and Shea, 2001), lack important information about the availability and characteristics of
retirement accounts (Duﬂo and Saez, 2002, 2003; Duﬂo et al., 2006), lack the willpower to save suﬃciently
(Thaler, 1994), or lack ﬁnancial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; van Rooij et al., 2007a). In fact,
as is demonstrated by Skinner (2007), the determination of an appropriate savings plan that implements
a given life cycle consumption proﬁle is highly complex, and inferring individuals’ true preferences from
their observed retirement preparation choices might be inappropriate. Furthermore, inferring people’s
true preferences from their actual choices would be diﬃcult, even in the absence of this concern, since the
actual choices may be constrained by the presence of a mandatory pension system. This is a particular
concern for many European countries whose pension systems oﬀer relatively high replacement rates (see
OECD, 2007).
2preference elicitation through surveys (Barsky et al., 1997; Kapteyn and Teppa, 2003).
We elicit measures of intertemporal and risk preferences based on survey questions that
are explicitly framed in terms of retirement preparation. This allows us to infer adequate
ratios of old-age to working-life consumption, minimum absolute adequate consumption
levels during retirement, as well as adequate levels of risk taking.
Two features of our novel survey design stand out. First, we tailor the survey ques-
tions individually to each respondent’s ﬁnancial situation, based on prior information
about a respondent’s socioeconomic characteristics, such as total household income. This
makes our questions meaningful in the context of the respondent’s personal situation.
Second, none of our questions requires respondents to understand any technical aspects
of retirement preparation, such as the concept of compound interest or inﬂation.
Our speciﬁcally designed internet survey module was conducted in two countries: with
the American Life Panel (ALP) at RAND in the U.S.; and with the CentERpanel (CP)
in the Netherlands. The U.S. embodies a country where individuals bear a substantial
amount of responsibility for their own retirement preparation, while the Netherlands is
a country with a typical European-style welfare state and a pension system that oﬀers
generous replacement rates.3 In particular, the after-tax income replacement rate for an
average earner amounts to about 85 percent in the Netherlands. In contrast, it amounts
to only about 50 percent in the U.S. (OECD, 2007). Our paper, therefore, also sheds light
on the question of whether notions of an adequate standard of living during retirement
diﬀer across such contrasting institutional setups and, if so, to what degree.
A main advantage of the survey approach is that it allows for learning directly about
individual preferences since it does not impose speciﬁc functional forms or parameter
values. Furthermore, the survey approach allows for testing whether the prescriptions of
the calibration approach or any other approach are consistent with the preferences that
3See Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004) for a comprehensive overview of pension systems around the world.
A replacement rate is deﬁned as the ratio of income obtained from a mandatory pension system during
retirement to the salary earned at the end of working life.
3individuals express themselves. As for any other approach, the survey approach has its
own disadvantages. Most notably, we need to assume that respondents understand our
questions and are motivated to answer them properly.
Overall, our study presents a novel way to elicit policy-relevant preference information
that is based on individually tailored surveys. Our claim is not that the survey approach
dominates any other method of investigating the nature of adequate retirement consump-
tion levels. Rather, we view our study as providing a new and complementary perspective
on the ongoing discussion about adequate standards of living during retirement.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, neglecting any risk associated with retirement
spending, we ﬁnd that ex-ante desirable ratios of old-age to working-life spending are
surprisingly high; they exceed 80 percent for a majority of respondents in both the U.S.
and the Netherlands. Second, we investigate the lower limits on old age spending below
which individuals would not want to fall in any case, and we estimate minimum income
replacement rates for each income quintile. For the U.S., these minimum replacement
rates amount to about 95 percent for respondents in the lowest income quintile and
gradually decrease to about 45 percent for respondents in the top income quintile. In the
Netherlands, this gradient is weaker and minimum replacement rates range between 75
and 60 percent. Third, our results show that risk aversion, elicited within a retirement
preparation context, is higher in the Netherlands than in the U.S., and there is a high
degree of individual heterogeneity with respect to risk aversion.4
Our results about desirable ratios of old-age to working-age income, about lower
bounds of old-age spending and about risk aversion are useful for inferring adequate
wealth accumulation and portfolio strategies. The necessity of information about desir-
4There is one other existing study that has made use of survey techniques and the Dutch CP in
the domain of retirement preparation: Van Rooij et al. (2007b) investigate whether respondents prefer
a mandatory pension system over a privatized one with a free choice of contribution rates and asset
allocation strategies. Furthermore, the authors explore whether respondents show a preference for a
deﬁned beneﬁt system with income guarantees over a deﬁned contribution system. The main diﬀerence
to our study is that we examine various aspects of individual preferences over standards of living rather
than preferences over features of pension design.
4able old-age consumption levels has become increasingly important in many countries due
to the shrinking number of people that are covered by deﬁned-beneﬁt pension schemes
(Banks et al. 2005b), and it is forcefully underlined in a number of very recent studies
(see, e.g., Fornero et al., 2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information about
our samples. Section 3 presents our results on ex-ante adequate old age spending in the
absence of risk. Section 4 brings risk into play. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Data
The Dutch CentERpanel. The Dutch CentERpanel (CP) is hosted by the data col-
lection agency CentERdata at Tilburg University, and the data used for the presented
analysis is publicly available from CentERdata. The CP consists of a sample of members
who regularly ﬁll out internet-based questionnaires, typically on weekends. There are two
types of questionnaires. First, panel members are regularly asked about socioeconomic
characteristics of their household within the framework of the so-called DNB Household
Survey. We use this information to tailor our questions to the respondent’s personal ﬁnan-
cial situation. Second, panel members are invited to answer special-topic questionnaire
modules such as ours from time to time.
An outstanding feature of the CP is that it is representative for the overall Dutch
population. Since internet penetration may be systematically lower in some subgroups of
the population, CentERdata provides households that do not own a computer or internet
connection with an add-on device that allows them to access internet via television. It
also provides a television if necessary.
Our questionnaire was conducted in March 2007. We presented the survey to panel
members who were older than 25 and who were either the household’s main breadwinner
or his or her spouse. We did not exclude retired panel members. Based on these selection
5criteria, 835 panel members answered our questionnaire. The actual number of responses
per question varies between 590 and 835.
The American Life Panel. The American Life Panel (ALP) at the RAND institu-
tion was modeled after the CP, and grants public access to the data used in this paper. As
in the case of the CP, ALP members regularly answer questions on general socioeconomic
characteristics. There are two main diﬀerences between the ALP and the CP. First, the
ALP is not fully representative of the overall U.S. population. Second, to provide re-
spondents with a psychological incentive to answer the questions carefully, ALP members
are paid an amount of $2 per interview minute. In contrast, CP-members are paid per
completed survey module and the amount depends on the number of years a household
has been a member of the panel and is lower than the amount paid to ALP members.
In the case of the ALP, our questionnaire was ﬁelded in November 2007. Using the
same selection criteria as in the case of the CP, 847 panel members answered our ques-
tionnaire. The actual number of responses per question varies between about 600 and
847.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our two samples. The income variable refers
to total household income per month after taxes. The respondents’ highest degree of pro-
fessional education is indicated by the two dummy variables “no vocational training” and
“university degree”. The excluded category is the middle one, i.e. if both dummy vari-
ables are zero, the corresponding respondent’s highest professional degree is a vocational
degree. The variable “children at home” indicates whether any children are living at the
respondent’s home. The ﬁgures in Table 1 show that ALP respondents are slightly richer
and better educated than the average American. In contrast, the CP is – by construction
– representative for the Dutch population along many socioeconomic characteristics.
63 Adequate Old Age Spending in the Absence of Risk
We address the question of what represents an adequate standard of living during re-
tirement from an ex-ante anticipatory perspective. This perspective corresponds to a
preference-based approach which basically underlies all of standard economic theory.
From the ex-ante perspective, the question of what represents an adequate standard of
living during retirement intrinsically relates to two key trade-oﬀs. The ﬁrst trade-oﬀ is
between spending during working life and spending during old age. The second trade-oﬀ is
between a safe but lower level of old age spending, and a more risky level of spending with
a higher expected value. The importance of these trade-oﬀs notwithstanding, there may
also be a minimum level of retirement spending below which individuals would not want
to fall even in exchange for very high levels of working life or expected old age spending.
This is the case for habit formation or Stone-Geary type preferences over intertemporal
consumption ﬂows (see Binswanger, 2007).
This discussion highlights the three main topics of our questionnaire, namely the in-
tertemporal trade-oﬀ, the risk-return trade-oﬀ, and the potential existence of a lower
bound on acceptable old age spending levels. We start our discussion with the intertem-
poral trade-oﬀ, since this is the most basic aspect of retirement preparation from an
economist’s point of view.
In the interest of keeping our questionnaire as transparent and simple as possible, our
survey questions on the intertemporal trade-oﬀ neglect any form of risk. Furthermore, we
do not consider any variation of spending within working life or within retirement. This
would lead to rather diﬃcult questions and, as a consequence, would reduce the reliability
of respondents’ answers. Hence, we concentrate on how average spending levels during
retirement compare to average spending levels during working life.
Speciﬁcally, we present each respondent i a total number of six options of monthly






, k = 1,2,...,6. The consumption
levels ck
w,i and ck
r,i represent absolute amounts. Respondents are asked to indicate which
7option they like most. The deﬁning property of each option is the ratio ck
r,i/ck
w,i, which
we set at 50, 64, 76, 88, 100, and 140 percent (up to rounding) for k = 1,2,...,6,
respectively. This includes the range of spending ratios that are commonly viewed as
potentially adequate. All six options are characterized by an identical present value of
lifetime consumption (see below).
It is important to stress that we show respondents absolute amounts of money, not per-
centages. We do so since respondents may ﬁnd imagining exactly what these percentage
numbers would mean for their personal situation diﬃcult. We do not inform respondents
that the ratios ck
r,i/ck
w,i correspond to the particular percentage numbers mentioned above.
On a ﬁrst screen, respondents only see four options corresponding to spending ratios
of 64, 76, 88, and 100 percent, respectively (see Table 2 for an example). This is meant
to avoid respondents having to process an excessive amount of information on one screen.
Only if a respondent chooses a ratio of 64 or 100 percent do we ask on a follow-up screen
if he or she would actually prefer the chosen option to that associated with a ratio of 50
or 140 percent, respectively.
The calculation of the individual spending proﬁles (ck
w,i, ck
r,i) is outlined in the Ap-
pendix. These proﬁles are determined according to the following requirements:
(i) All options are tailored to respondents’ income. In particular, the option with the
highest working-life spending level ck
w,i on the ﬁrst screen approximately equals total
household income after taxes.








These requirements ensure that all presented options appear realistic to the respon-
dents in light of their personal ﬁnancial situation. In particular, we rule out that any of
the values of ck
w,i on the ﬁrst screen exceeds the respondent’s current household income
in order to not alienate respondents to whom such options would appear infeasible. All
8presented numbers are rounded to entire multiples of 50 or 20 units of the corresponding
currency.5
The introductory text to our spending proﬁle questions is as follows:6
Below you ﬁnd four options of how you could spend your money over your
lifetime. For each option the ﬁrst column indicates how much your household
could spend on average per month from age 25 until retirement. Thus, this
refers to your total (working) age from age 25 until retirement, not just the
remaining (working) age. The second column indicates how much your house-
hold could spend during retirement. Please think of all your expenditures, such
as food, clothing, accommodation, insurance, traveling etc. Assume that the
numbers below show what you can spend after having already paid for taxes.
Assume also that prices of the things you spend your money on remain the
same in the future as today (no inﬂation). If you had a choice, which option
would you like most?7
Table 2 shows an example of a table with the actual options appearing below the above
introductory text. The numbers correspond to a monthly household income after taxes of
3,000 U.S. dollars. Table 2 refers to an interest rate of one percent.8 After having indicated
their favorite proﬁle, respondents are presented with a second table, corresponding to
an interest rate of six percent. In this second table, the ratios of the spending levels
are identical. However, for a higher interest rate, achieving a given level of retirement







imply any assumptions about actual savings behavior of respondents. Our goal is only to show respondents
feasible spending proﬁles in order to learn which of the proﬁles they would like most. Note further that
our analysis neglects both a bequest motive and health expenditure shocks during retirement. We do so
for two related reasons. First, it is of interest to know what spending proﬁles individuals prefer in the
absence of other perturbing factors. Second, bringing bequests and unexpected health shocks into play
would make our survey questions much more demanding.
6Here, we only report the English version of our survey questions. The Dutch version is available from
the authors upon request.
7For single households the text is adapted accordingly. If a respondent was retired, then we added as
a ﬁrst sentence to the above text: Please suppose for a moment that you were not yet retired.
8See the appendix for how ck
w,i and ck
r,i depend on the interest rate.
9spending requires giving up less working-life spending. As a result, the distances between
the numbers in the ﬁrst column are smaller and the distances in the second column are
larger, compared to Table 2.






from Table 2 need not have an understanding of compound interest rate calculations,
inﬂation or any other technical detail. Our inference based on respondents’ answers only
depends on the assumption that individuals have well-deﬁned preferences over spending
proﬁles such as shown in Table 2. The assumption that individuals have well-deﬁned
preferences is much weaker than the assumption that individuals are able to make utility
maximizing choices. People may well know what spending proﬁle they would like to
achieve, but they may not be able to implement it, due to, e.g., ﬁnancial illiteracy.
As mentioned in the introduction, the seminal papers on the elicitation of time prefer-
ences through survey questions are Barsky et al. (1997) and Kapteyn and Teppa (2003).
In principle, the setup in these two papers is similar to ours9, but there are two key diﬀer-
ences. First, the questions in Barsky et al. (1997) and in Kapteyn and Teppa (2003) are
neither worded nor framed in the context of retirement preparation. Second, our ques-
tions are substantially less diﬃcult since they are individually tailored to a respondent’s
personal ﬁnancial situation and since the information we provide is easy to process. This
makes the questions more meaningful to respondents and reduces cognitive load.
Our results about desired consumption proﬁles are shown in Table 3. The upper panel
shows the result for the subsample of non-retirees whereas the lower panel shows the
result for the subsample of retired respondents. We ﬁnd that the distribution of chosen
9Barsky et al. (1997) ask respondents to imagine that their current age is 50 and that there is a
guaranteed income stream of $3000 per month from age 50 to 80. They then present individuals with
diﬀerent proﬁles of monthly consumption. Each proﬁle consists of a pair of numbers where the elements
of the pair are (i) monthly spending from age 50 to 65, and (ii) monthly spending from age 65 to 80.
All pairs have a present value which is equal to the present value of earning $3000 per month. Kapteyn
and Teppa (2003) show respondents a table with various consumption proﬁles that diﬀer in terms of the
rate at which consumption increases over time. On a typical screen, respondents see ﬁve consumption
proﬁles, each consisting of consumption levels at nine consecutive ages. This format involves about 45
numbers per screen, thus the cognitive load is substantially higher than in the case of our questions.
10spending ratios does not diﬀer between the two subsamples for both the ALP and the
CP.10
The key observations are the following. First, irrespective of the sample and the level
of the interest rate, only very few respondents prefer a spending proﬁle corresponding to
a ratio of 50 or 64 percent. Second, there is substantial mass concentrated on the options
corresponding to spending ratios of 76, 88, and 100 percent. Third, the 140 percent option
is very popular in the U.S., but not in the Netherlands, at an interest rate of one percent.
Finally, consistent with economic theory, the 140 percent option is much more popular for
an interest rate of six percent than for an interest rate of one percent in both countries.
It is noteworthy that economic theory predicts that, for a given individual, the spend-
ing ratio should not be lower for the 6 percent scenario than for the 1 percent scenario.
We ﬁnd that, in both samples, only 12 percent of the respondents violate this prediction.
This compares favorably to Barsky et al. (1997) where 21 percent changed the slope of
the desired consumption path in the wrong direction.11
The diﬀerences in the distributions of preferred spending ratios between the U.S. and
the Dutch sample are statistically signiﬁcant.12 This mainly reﬂects the fact that the 140
percent option is much more popular in the U.S. The pattern that a substantial fraction
of Americans desire an upward sloping consumption proﬁle is consistent with the ﬁnding
in Hurd and Rohwedder (2008) that a similar fraction of individuals in their U.S.-based
sample exhibit de-facto increasing spending proﬁles around retirement. This may be
explained by the fact that Americans may ﬁnd postponing consumption (e.g. in the form
of traveling) until retirement as a complement to leisure more desirable. This is in line
with the fact that the number of vacation days is typically much lower in the U.S. than
in the Netherlands.13 As a result, people working in the U.S. may ﬁnd delaying spending
10This is based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of distributions (all p-values are larger
than 0.30).
11The correlation coeﬃcient between the chosen ratios for the two interest rate scenarios is 0.66 (p <
0.01) for the ALP and 0.61 (p < 0.01) for the CP.
12Based on a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, equality is rejected at the 1-percent signiﬁcance level.
13In 2005, the number of annual hours worked per worker amounted to about 1,900 in the U.S. and
11power until retirement – when they have the time to enjoy leisure and traveling – more
valuable relative to their Dutch colleagues.
In order to explore the reliability of the elicited data, we randomized the order of the
response options. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two treatments. Half
of the respondents saw the numbers arranged in the order as in Table 2, where the order
of the spending ratios is decreasing. The other half saw the numbers arranged with an
increasing order of spending ratios. We do not ﬁnd any evidence that our results diﬀer
across randomization treatments.
The main conclusion drawn from the results discussed in this section is that a substan-
tial fraction of the population prefers spending ratios that exceed 80 percent of working
life spending. This applies to both the Netherlands and the U.S. In the case that old age
spending is exposed to risk, our ﬁnding would apply to certainty equivalence values of old
age spending.
4 Bringing Risk into Play
We consider risk from two diﬀerent perspectives. First, we conceptualize risk from the
perspective of a lower limit on old age spending below which an individual would not want
to fall in almost any case. This represents a particularly simple framework for thinking
about risk since it does not require evaluating any risk-return trade-oﬀ. Such a framework
corresponds to the logic of poverty thresholds as well as to preferences with habit formation
or Stone-Geary utility functions.14 Information on such a minimum acceptable level of
old age spending is very useful for thinking about adequate retirement preparation. It
speciﬁes a benchmark spending level that an individual may want to exceed, from an
ex-ante point of view, with a very high probability. Thus, such a benchmark helps to
identify adequate asset allocation strategies for individual retirement accounts. It also
about 1,400 in the Netherlands (OECD, 2008).
14See Binswanger (2007).
12implies an overall lower bound on adequate savings for retirement.
Second, we are interested in how respondents evaluate potential risk-return trade-
oﬀs. We therefore also include a standard set of questions in our survey for identifying
coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion. While several existing studies have used survey
methods to elicit this parameter (Barsky et al., 1997; Dohmen et al., 2005; Holt and
Laury, 2002), the novel aspect here is that we elicit this parameter strictly in the context
of retirement preparation and that the options respondents choose between are again
tailored to their personal ﬁnancial situation.
We start with the analysis of lower bounds on old age spending.
4.1 Lower Limits on Adequate Old Age Spending
We present respondents the following question.
This question refers to the overall level of spending that applies to you and
your partner during retirement. What is a minimal level of monthly spending
that you never want to fall below during retirement, at all costs? Please think
of all your expenditures, such as food, clothing, accommodation, insurance etc.
Assume that prices of the things you spend your money on remain the same
in the future as today (no inﬂation).
The question is framed in a way that we should expect answers to diﬀer across diﬀerent
countries if they are characterized by diﬀerent institutions. For instance, the answers to
this question may diﬀer between countries with diﬀerent health insurance schemes.15
15In contrast to the U.S., health insurance is compulsory for everyone in the Netherlands. It is sup-
plied by private insurance companies and premiums are paid by each insured individual herself. Health
insurance pays for most doctor visits and pharmaceuticals as well as for hospital stays up to one year.
Furthermore, every resident is covered by a public long-term care insurance scheme (dubbed AWBZ)
that covers nursing homes and long-term hospital stays. The U.S. Medicare system requires a 20 percent
copayment for hospital stays, a feature that has no counterpart in the Netherlands. Covering this copay-
ment requires an extra (non-mandatory) so-called Medigap insurance. (The requirement of a copayment
drops if Medicaid covers care costs.)
13For the ALP, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the answers amount to 2,000,
3,000, and 4,000 year-2007 U.S. dollars per month, respectively. The 25th, 50th and
75th percentiles of the ratio of the answers to total monthly household income after taxes
amount to .48, .73, and .95, respectively. For the CP, the respective absolute numbers are
1,200, 1,600, and 2,000 year-2007 euros per month. The respective ratios of the answers
to total household income after taxes are .56, .72, and .88.
Table 4 shows median regressions with the answers to the above question as the de-
pendent variable.16 Our estimation results show that income primarily determines the
minimally acceptable spending level.17 In particular, minimum spending levels do not
depend in a statistically signiﬁcant way on age, regardless of the order of the age polyno-
mial. This means that the current age does not systematically aﬀect the way respondents
anticipate their minimum retirement needs. This is exactly what we should expect if
respondents anticipate these needs in a rational manner.
Interestingly, retired respondents are more conservative with respect to their minimum
needs in the Netherlands. Everything else equal, a retired respondent in the Dutch sample
indicates a minimum spending level that is higher by 230 Euros, compared to a non-retired
respondent. There is no such eﬀect for the U.S. It is noteworthy that the regression results
in Table 4 are robust across many diﬀerent speciﬁcations that we have estimated.
The regression results in Table 4 allow for calibrating minimum acceptable spending
levels for any combination of household characteristics we may be interested in. Since our
results show income to be clearly the most important determinant for minimum spending
levels, we calibrate such spending levels for each income quintile. We do so for a non-single
household aged 50 that is not retired.18 Furthermore, we set the values of the dummy
16Given the skewness of the data, we use median regressions, since a median regression is a more robust
estimation method than OLS.
17For the ALP, the dummy variables indicating income quintiles do not refer to the quintiles according
to our sample but according to the Current Population Survey. Since the ALP is not representative for
the U.S. population, this makes it easier to interpret the results. For the CP, the quintiles refer to our
sample.
18Similar results are obtained for ages of 40 or 60.
14variables for children, home ownership, no vocational training, and for having a university
degree to zero.
The calibration results are shown in Table 5. The upper panel refers to the ALP
and the measurement units are year-2007 U.S. dollars. The lower panel refers to the CP
and the units are year-2007 euros. The ﬁrst column in each of the two panels shows
the calibrated monthly minimum spending levels. The second column simply reports the
monthly median after-tax incomes in our samples for each income quintile. The striking
pattern in Table 5 is that the increments in minimum spending levels are smaller than
the increments in income. This pattern is particularly pronounced for the U.S., which is
reﬂected in the strongly decreasing ratios of spending levels to incomes, as shown in the
third column of Table 5.
For the U.S., the ratio of the minimally desired spending level to income for the ﬁrst
quintile is as high as 95 percent. For all other quintiles in case of the U.S., and for all
quintiles in the Netherlands, the calibrated ratios are markedly smaller than one. This
suggests that people anticipate that they would be able to cut back if necessary. This
result is consistent with the recent ﬁnding of Aguiar and Hurst (2007) that the elderly
spend less money for a given amount of “consumption intake”.
What do we further learn from Table 5? Our calibrations are useful in two further
respects. First, they prove helpful in designing adequate asset allocation strategies, since
any asset allocation strategy maps into a distribution of available resources during retire-
ment. Our calibrations help identify adequate portfolio strategies in that, say, the 10th
percentile of the resulting distribution of monthly spending should exceed the values in
the ﬁrst column of Table 5. Second, the numbers in Table 5 may be useful for thinking
about adequate beneﬁt levels in a mandatory pension system.
154.2 Relative Risk Aversion
Our ﬁnal question elicits the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Experimental and survey
research in economics and social psychology (e.g., Weber et al., 2002) suggests that risk
preferences diﬀer across domains or that individuals may anticipate to be more risk averse
during old age. Therefore, it is not a priori clear how appropriate it may be to apply results
from existing preference elicitation studies to the domain of old age provision. We thus
believe that it is of interest to elicit the parameter of relative risk aversion by using a
question format framed strictly in terms of retirement preparation.
In order to elicit the parameter of relative risk aversion, we employ the widely-used
multiple price list design of Holt and Laury (2002). Speciﬁcally, respondents are presented
with the following question.
In the following table we present ﬁve choices to you. You can always choose
between two diﬀerent types of income during retirement, income of type A
and of type B. Please assume that these incomes include all sources of money
available to you during retirement. In particular, there is no additional money
available from spending down your wealth. If you choose income type A, the
total income during retirement for you and your partner will always be [Zs
i]
per month, independent of the performance of the economy. If you choose type
B, the total income during retirement for you and your partner depends on
the performance of the economy (e.g. on returns in ﬁnancial markets). If the
economic performance is unfavorable it will always be [Zrl
i ] per month. If the
performance is favorable it will always be [Zrh
i ] per month. The ﬁve choices
diﬀer only in terms of the chance that the favorable or unfavorable economic
performance will materialize. Which income type would you choose?
A: [Zs
i] Euros, or
B: [1 − π] percent chance of [Zrl
i ], and [π] percent chance of [Zrh
i ].
16(...)
The probability π is set to 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90 percent for the ﬁve choice situations,
respectively. We set Zs
i to 85 percent of a respondent’s current monthly income, Zrl
i
to 70 and Zrh
i to 100 percent of her current monthly income. However, it is important
to stress that, as in the case of risk-free spending ratios in Section 3, respondents see
absolute money values and are not made aware that these values correspond to particular
replacement rates. All values are again rounded to entire multiples of 50 or 20 units of
the corresponding currency, depending on their magnitude.
Under CRRA preferences, expected utility of a random prospect ˜ x is deﬁned as








where θ denotes the parameter of relative risk aversion and E the mathematical expec-
tation operator. We identify the value of θ for each respondent by using information
on her switching point. Speciﬁcally, respondents indicate whether they would prefer the
safe option (A) or the risky option (B) when the probability for the high realization as-
sociated with the risky option amounts to 50, 60, 70, 80, or 90 percent, respectively.
If, for instance, a respondent prefers the safe option in the case of 60 percent and the
risky option in case of 70 percent, his switch point is given by the 70-percent prospect.
We then know that 1/(1 − θ)(Zs
i)



















￿1−θ. This allows us to iden-
tify the highest value of θ that is consistent with the respondent’s switching point.19
Table 6 shows that, for the ALP, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the observed
distribution of θ are 2, 4 and 7, respectively. For the CP they amount to 4, 7, and 12.
Clearly, the Dutch respondents are far more risk averse than the U.S. respondents. How-
19Identical with Holt and Laury (2002), we use the (last) point where a subject switches from option A
to option B. The vast majority of our respondents (95 percent for the CP, and 94 percent for the ALP)
only switches once. As in Holt and Laury (2002), we ﬁnd that the analysis reported here does not change
if we drop respondents who switch from B back to A.
17ever, there is also considerable heterogeneity within each country. This is an important
result for calibration studies aiming to identify optimal retirement saving and asset allo-
cation strategies as well as an optimal design of a mandatory pension system. It indicates
the importance of taking individual preference heterogeneity into account.
It is of interest to compare our results to the ones reported by Barsky et al. (1997).
They infer relative risk aversion from questions framed in terms of hypothetical “lotteries”
over jobs. The 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the distribution for relative risk aversion
in their sample are 4, 7, and 14, respectively.20 Respondents in the Barsky et al. (1997)
study were Americans, hence we compare their results to our ﬁndings from the American
data (ALP). Since the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile amount to 2, 4 and 7, respectively,
for the ALP, we measure a lower level of risk aversion. One potential reason for this is
that risk aversion may be context-speciﬁc and higher in the domain of job search than for
retirement preparation.
As before, we also investigate the reliability of our responses. To this end, the order
of the response options was randomized. Again, we do not ﬁnd any evidence that our
results diﬀer across randomization treatments.
Overall, our results indicate substantial heterogeneity in risk aversion, even within
one country. This means that, in terms of risk management, adequate old age provision
may entail diﬀerent strategies (e.g., equity shares) for diﬀerent individuals. Moreover, the
general levels of risk aversion diﬀer between countries. Thus, a mandatory pension sys-
tem aiming at adequate risk management may provide diﬀerent safety levels in diﬀerent
countries. Our elicited values of relative risk aversion may help to gauge the amount of
heterogeneity in risk preferences between individuals as well as the diﬀerences between
countries. They may provide a starting point for the calibration of desirable risk man-
agement strategies for individual portfolios as well as for entire (potentially mandatory)
pension systems. The availability of information about desirable risk levels for old-age
20See their footnote 18 on p. 548. When comparing these values with ours, note that the authors
report values for relative risk tolerance on p. 548, i.e. the inverse of relative risk aversion.
18consumption has become increasingly important due to the shrinking number of people
that are covered by deﬁned-beneﬁt pension schemes (Banks et al. 2005b).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we use a speciﬁcally designed internet survey, conducted in the U.S. and the
Netherlands, to address the question of what represents an adequate standard of living
during old age. We address this question from an ex-ante point of view, consistent with
the perspective suggested by economic theory.
We ﬁnd that a large majority of individuals aims to achieve a spending proﬁle where,
under normal circumstances, old-age spending exceeds 80 percent of working-life spending.
Bringing risk into play, there is clear evidence that individuals do not want to fall below a
certain lower limit of old-age spending. We use respondents’ answers to calibrate minimum
income replacement rates for each income quintile. For the U.S. sample, these range
between 95 percent for the lowest income quintile and 45 percent for the highest. For
the Netherlands, these rates fall between 75 and 60 percent. Turning to the question of
how respondents evaluate risk-return trade-oﬀs, we ﬁnd considerable heterogeneity of risk
aversion within and between samples.
Taken together, our elicited values of minimally desirable spending levels and of values
of relative risk aversion may be used for calibrating desirable risk management strategies.
For this, one may proceed along the line of Binswanger (2007) who provides a simple
framework for the analysis of risk management strategies in the domain of old age pro-
vision and pension design. In particular, one may infer critical lower bounds on wealth
accumulation and estimate optimal contribution and beneﬁt levels for a pension system.
In future research, our approach using an individually tailored and randomized survey
design for eliciting information on preferences could be combined with data on further
dimensions of individuals’ circumstances – ranging from physical to mental and psycho-
19logical circumstances – in order to understand the heterogeneity of retirement preferences
better (see, e.g., Banks, 2006). Furthermore, our approach can be applied in various other
domains that are important for policy. For example, consider information on individual
preferences with respect to the trade-oﬀ between lower contributions to the welfare state
and higher levels of risk borne by private individuals. Such information is relevant for the
identiﬁcation of a desirable design of social policy as well as of desirable macroeconomic
policies. Carefully elicited information on people’s preferences will stimulate the interac-
tion between theoretical and empirical researchers, will make the policy discourse richer,
and may ultimately lead to better policies.
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24Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
ALP CP
Mean Median Standard deviation Mean Median Standard deviation
Age 51.04 52 14.29 50.40 51 16.10
Income 5,000 4,521 6,001 2,419 2,250 1,612
Single 0.21 0 0.41 0.21 0 0.40
Children at home 0.25 0 0.44 0.36 0 0.48
Home ownership 0.80 1 0.40 0.71 1 0.45
Retired 0.27 0 0.44 0.22 0 0.41
No vocational training 0.17 0 0.38 0.31 0 0.46
University degree 0.47 0 0.50 0.11 0 0.31
Note: Total number of respondents is 847 for the ALP and 835 for the CP. Income refers to
monthly income and is measured in year-2007 U.S. dollars for the ALP and in year-2007 euros
for the CP.
25Table 2: Options of expenditures proﬁles (example)
Monthly spending during working life (age
25 until retirement) in U.S. dollars
Monthly spending during
retirement in U.S. dollars
Option A 2,650 2,650
Option B 2,750 2,400
Option C 2,850 2,150
Option D 2,950 1,900
Note: The numbers refer to a monthly income of 3,000 U.S. dollars.
Table 3: Distribution of preferred spending ratios for non-retirees and retirees
Panel A: Non-retirees
ALP CP
Spending ratio Interest rate of Interest rate of
1 percent 6 percent 1 percent 6 percent
50 percent 5 7 4 7
64 percent 11 6 5 4
76 percent 16 13 23 14
88 percent 24 22 36 33
100 percent 17 11 23 22
140 percent 25 41 8 20
Panel B: Retirees
ALP CP
Spending ratio Interest rate of Interest rate of
1 percent 6 percent 1 percent 6 percent
50 percent 7 8 2 2
64 percent 9 10 9 3
76 percent 18 16 19 14
88 percent 25 19 34 35
100 percent 20 13 28 26
140 percent 20 34 7 19
Note: The numbers indicate percentages of observations. The total
number of non-retirees are 576 for the ALP and 539 for the CP. The
total number of retirees are 211 for the ALP and 169 for the CP.
26Table 4: Median regressions for minimum acceptable old age spending levels
ALP CP
Income quintile 2 784.56∗∗ 437.63∗∗
(273.53) (82.09)
Income quintile 3 1481.72∗∗ 587.37∗∗
(267.83) (87.08)
Income quintile 4 2343.20∗∗ 937.03∗∗
(251.82) (92.31)




Age2 / 100 206.51 213.78
(272.33) (119.07)




Children at home 130.75 54.05
(185.68) (71.60)




No vocational training -169.53 -0.00
(231.45) (61.68)




Pseudo R2 0.24 0.28
Number of observations 591 576
Note: The dependent variable is measured in year-
2007 U.S. dollars for the ALP and in year-2007
euros for the CP. One and two asterisks denote
signiﬁcance at the ﬁve and one percent level, re-
spectively. Robust standard errors are indicated in
parentheses.
27Table 5: Minimum acceptable old age spending levels and minimum replacement rates
ALP
Minimum spending Median income Ratio
Quintile 1 1005 1058 0.95
Quintile 2 1794 2344 0.77
Quintile 3 2485 3215 0.77
Quintile 4 3349 6384 0.52
Quintile 5 4080 9054 0.45
CP
Minimum spending Median income Ratio
Quintile 1 911 1359 0.67
Quintile 2 1347 1835 0.73
Quintile 3 1501 2300 0.65
Quintile 4 1850 2875 0.64
Quintile 5 2364 3765 0.62
Note: Minimum spending levels per month are calculated
setting age to 50. In case of the ALP, income quintiles re-
fer to the Current Population Survey, not the ALP itself.
Numbers in the upper panel represent year-2007 U.S. dol-
lars. Numbers in the lower panel represent year-2007 euros.




Std. dev. 4.1 4.2
25th percentile 2 4
50th percentile 4 7
75th percentile 7 12
28Appendix:
Derivation of Spending Proﬁles of Section 3






that underly the anal-
ysis in Section 3. For the derivation of these proﬁles we make a number of simplifying
assumptions. A respondent’s working life is assumed to start at the age of 25. Further-
more, we assume that respondents retire at age 65 in case of the ALP and at 61 in case
of the CP.21 We neglect mortality risk and assume that death occurs with certainty after
age 85.22
























r,i = PV Yi.
R denotes the retirement age and amounts to either 65 or 61. r denotes the real risk-free
interest rate. (Respondents are ﬁrst asked to choose their favorite spending proﬁle for an
interest rate of one percent and then for an interest rate of six percent.) PV Yi denotes a
















0.64 (0.98 Yi). (1)
Yi represents respondent i’s total annual household income after taxes and after deduction
of contributions to existing mandatory pension systems. We do observe Yi from previous
survey modules.
21In the U.S., Social Security beneﬁts can be claimed beginning at age 62. The normal retirement age
varies between 65 and 67 depending on the year of birth. In the Netherlands, ﬁrst-pillar beneﬁts can be
claimed from the age of 60 on, while the normal retirement age is 65. Eﬀective retirement ages are 64
and 61 for the U.S. and the Netherlands, respectively (OECD, 2006).
22According to the 2008 OASDI Trustees Report (OASDI, 2008), life expectancy at age 65 currently
amounts to 81.7 for men and 84.2 for women. It is expected to increase to 84.3 for men and to 86.4 for
women in 2050.
29Two features of (1) require explanation. First, we use 98 Yi instead of Yi for the
calculation of the hypothetical present value of income. This is done to assure that the
number corresponding to the highest ck
w,i on the ﬁrst screen does not exceed Yi even after
rounding (which may mean upward rounding). Second, we need to explain the presence
of the number 0.64. Our calculation of PV Yi implicitly assumes that retirement income
equals 64 percent of working-life income. This assumption is hypothetical. It implies that
if ck
w,i is equal to current income, then ck
r,i/ck
w,i is equal to 0.64. This is thus the case for
the option with the highest ck
w,i on the ﬁrst screen, where ck
w,i is approximately equal to Yi.
Our implicit reasoning behind this is that the observed income Yi is net of contributions
to currently existing mandatory pension systems. These contributions may be suﬃcient
to achieve an income replacement rate of 64 percent in a fully-funded pension system.23






do not imply any assumptions about actual savings behavior of respondents. Our pur-
pose is uniquely to show respondents spending proﬁles that are feasible under the above
assumptions in order to learn which of the feasible proﬁles they would like most.
23The average current U.S. Social Security replacement rate is only around 40 percent due to the
very low implicit returns of the Social Security system. When fully phased in, a fully-funded system
would allow to ﬁnance much higher replacement rates (see Feldstein and Ranguelova, 2001). The Dutch
mandatory pension system depends heavily on a funded component. A typical income replacement rate
after taxes for a full employment history is 85 percent. We suspect that this number will decrease due to
aging and increases in longevity.
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